Can Trump Push Pakistan Into China’s Arms? The Abraham Accords Dilemma
Donald Trump has once again placed the Abraham Accords at the centre of his foreign policy agenda. The accords which began in 2020 aimed to normalize relations between Israel and several Muslim-majority countries. For Trump, expanding these agreements is not simply another diplomatic initiative but it is one of the defining achievements of his foreign policy legacy. In May 2026, reports emerged that the Trump administration was pressuring several Muslim-majority countries, including Pakistan to join the Abraham Accords and recognize Israel. Islamabad quickly rejected this offer and Pakistani leaders publicly stating that normalization with Israel was not acceptable under current circumstances.
At first glance, this pressure seems surprising because relations between the United States and Pakistan have recently improved. The two countries have signed new economic agreements, and Washington has shown a willingness to rebuild ties with Islamabad after years of mistrust. On paper, the relationship between both countries appears stronger than it has been in years, but this apparent warmth hides a much deeper problem.
Pakistan’s domestic politics, religious identity, regional geography and security calculations make recognizing Israel extremely difficult. If Washington tries to turn the Abraham Accords into a test of loyalty, it is unlikely to achieve its desired outcome. Instead, such pressure could damage the fragile improvement in US-Pakistan relations and push Islamabad even further toward its long-standing strategic partner, China. The irony is very clear: a policy intended to pull Pakistan closer to America may end up accelerating Pakistan’s dependence on Beijing.
The Transactional Facade: Trump 2.0 and Pakistan
To understand why Trump believes he has leverage over Pakistan, one must first understand the nature of the current US-Pakistan relationship. Under Trump’s second term relations between both countries have improved unexpectedly. This improvement is largely transactional rather than strategic. It is based on immediate benefits, personal diplomacy and economic deals instead of shared values or long-term trust. Pakistan’s leadership understood early that Trump prefers direct business arrangements and personal relationships over traditional diplomacy. Islamabad tried to present itself as a useful partner that could offer economic opportunities and regional cooperation. One of the most important examples was the reported $500 million rare earth minerals agreement signed in October 2025. Pakistan attempted to position itself as a valuable supply-chain partner for the United States by offering open access to its mineral resources, especially at a time when Washington is trying to reduce its dependence on China for critical minerals.
Pakistan’s desire for American goodwill goes beyond economics. The need for support from Washington became clear during the events of Operation Sindoor in May 2025. Following major regional tensions, India reportedly launched a series of missile and drone strikes against targets inside Pakistan. Facing serious military pressure and economic weakness, Islamabad urgently needed diplomatic support. The United States eventually used its influence to encourage de-escalation and push for a ceasefire and saved Pakistan. From Pakistan’s perspective this intervention prevented a potentially disastrous situation from becoming even worse. As a result Islamabad today has strong incentives to maintain cordial relations with Washington.
Pakistan sees the relationship as a business arrangement. It wants investment, diplomatic support and economic opportunities while preserving its traditional foreign policy positions. Trump appears to see the relationship differently. His administration increasingly expects political and ideological loyalty in return for American support. This difference is crucial because the relationship remains shallow and fragile. US-Pakistan relations stand on shaky foundations. The moment Washington demands that Pakistan cross its ideological red lines the entire arrangement becomes vulnerable and no issue represents a bigger red line than recognizing Israel.
The Iran Reality Check: A Dangerous Double Game
Pakistan’s behaviour in the Middle East provides another reason why joining the Abraham Accords would be extremely difficult. During recent tensions involving the United States, Israel and Iran, Pakistan publicly attempted to portray itself as a neutral mediator. Islamabad called for restraint, promoting diplomacy and channels of communication open with all sides. This public posture allowed Pakistan to preserve relations with Washington while avoiding direct confrontation with Tehran. Pakistan’s foreign policy has often involved balancing multiple and sometimes contradictory relationships.
Pakistan historically accepted American assistance while simultaneously pursuing independent regional policies that often conflicted with US objectives. Pakistan’s behaviour today reflects a similar pattern. Reports and intelligence claims have alleged that Iranian aircraft may have used Pakistani facilities during periods of heightened tensions. Whether every allegation can be fully verified or not, the controversy itself reveals an important reality: Pakistan cannot afford to alienate Iran, because the two countries share a long border. They also face common concerns regarding border security, sectarian violence, refugee movements and regional stability. Pakistan also worries that hostile relations with Tehran could create additional security problems along its western frontier. For Islamabad, maintaining a workable relationship with Iran is not a matter of ideology but a matter of geography. “Countries can change allies but they cannot change neighbours”. This geographical reality makes openly embracing Israel far more complicated than Washington may assume. If Pakistan already struggles to balance relations between America and Iran then recognizing Israel would create an entirely new set of regional complications and any American strategy that ignores these realities risks misunderstanding Pakistan’s fundamental security calculations.
The Domestic Tripwire: Fundamentalism and Political Suicide
Pakistan’s domestic politics would make such a decision extraordinarily dangerous even if Pakistan’s civilian leaders wanted to sign the Abraham Accords. Pakistan is not a secular republic, it is an Islamic Republic whose national identity has been shaped by religion since its creation in 1947. Support for the Palestinian cause is deeply embedded within Pakistani political culture so for decades successive governments have refused to recognize Israel and arguing that normalization can only occur after a just resolution of the Palestinian issue. This position enjoys support across large sections of Pakistani society.
Religious parties, conservative organizations and mainstream political figures all generally oppose recognizing Israel under present conditions. It is also important to note that, Pakistan possesses powerful religious groups capable of mobilizing enormous street protests. Organizations like Tehreek-e-Labbaik Pakistan (TLP) have repeatedly demonstrated their ability to bring major cities to a standstill and create significant political pressure on governments so any move toward recognizing Israel could trigger widespread protests and accusations that the government had betrayed Islamic principles.
The Pakistani military, which remains the country’s most powerful institution, derives a significant portion of its legitimacy from presenting itself as the defender of Pakistan’s Islamic identity and national security, so a decision that could be perceived as surrendering to foreign pressure could create serious internal tensions. This does not necessarily mean that Pakistan would descend into civil war. Such predictions are impossible to make with certainty. It does mean, however, that the political costs of recognizing Israel would be exceptionally high. For any Pakistani government, these risks could include political instability, mass protests, loss of legitimacy and severe pressure on state institutions so the domestic price of joining the Abraham Accords may simply be too high. Faced with a choice between displeasing Washington and creating domestic chaos, Pakistani leaders are far more likely to reject American demands.
The Chinese Safety Net: A Structural Reality
Whenever Pakistan’s relationship with the United States becomes difficult Islamabad has traditionally turned toward Beijing. This pattern has repeated itself for decades. China has consistently presented itself as Pakistan’s “all-weather strategic partner” offering support without publicly attaching ideological conditions. Over time this relationship has become increasingly structural. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) China now supplies the vast majority of Pakistan’s major military equipment reflecting growing military interoperability between the two countries. During the recent conflict with India, Pakistan’s dependence on Chinese military technology, surveillance capabilities and defence systems became increasingly evident. From Islamabad’s perspective China remains the country’s most reliable long term security partner.
The economic relationship is becoming equally important. China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) initially focused on infrastructure development, roads, ports and energy projects. Phase 2.0 of CPEC represents something much deeper. The new phase focuses on industrial cooperation manufacturing, technology transfer and integrating Pakistan into Chinese supply chains. This transformation is significant because Pakistan’s economy is facing serious challenges including debt, slow industrial growth and repeated balance of payment crises. China has invested tens of billions of dollars in Pakistan over many years. These investments have created economic links that are far deeper than any recent American mineral agreement. If Washington attempts to punish Pakistan over the Abraham Accords by reducing economic cooperation, Beijing would likely be willing to expand its economic role.
China also offers something Pakistan finds extremely attractive which is predictability of Chinese foreign policy toward Pakistan. American policies toward Pakistan have often changed with different administrations. Chinese policy has remained comparatively consistent. Beijing does not demand that Pakistan change its position on Palestine alter its domestic political system or restructure its regional relationships. For Islamabad this no ideological strings attached approach makes China a dependable strategic option. American pressure over Israel would not leave Pakistan without alternatives. It would simply make the Chinese alternative even more attractive.
Conclusion
Donald Trump’s effort to expand the Abraham Accords may achieve diplomatic success in some parts of the Muslim world. Pakistan presents an entirely different challenge. Pakistan's religious identity, domestic political realities, regional geography and security dependence on China severely limit its ability to normalize relations with Israel. Recent improvements in US-Pakistan relations are real but fragile. They are based largely on transactions, economic incentives and short-term diplomatic cooperation rather than deep strategic trust. If Washington transforms recognition of Israel into a mandatory loyalty test, it risks fundamentally misunderstanding Pakistan’s internal constraints.
Islamabad is unlikely to accept a policy that could trigger domestic instability, complicate relations with Iran and undermine its political legitimacy. Instead, Pakistan would probably do what it has repeatedly done in moments of tension with the United States, and deepen its strategic partnership with China. The result would be a major geopolitical irony: a policy intended to pull Pakistan closer to Washington could instead accelerate Islamabad’s long-term alignment with Beijing. Rather than expanding American influence in South Asia, coercive diplomacy over the Abraham Accords may end up strengthening China’s position in one of the world’s most strategically important regions. In geopolitics, pressure does not always produce compliance; sometimes it pushes countries directly into the arms of their alternatives.
Written By: Chandan Vishwas Edited By: Arpit Khanduri
Comments